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NATurALLY uNDerSTANDINg NATurALISm
Stewart Goetz
In his excellent book World without Design, michael rea argues that natural-
ism is not a philosophical thesis but a research program. I believe that there 
is good reason to question rea’s claim about naturalism. In this brief paper, I 
critique rea’s argument and defend a particular understanding of naturalism 
as a philosophical thesis.
Barry Stroud writes that “‘Naturalism’ seems to me . . . rather like ‘World 
Peace.’ Almost everyone swears allegiance to it, and is willing to march 
under its banner.”1 Though naturalism is orthodoxy among the intellec-
tual establishment, some of us are not true believers. One of the most in-
teresting critiques of naturalism in recent years is that of michael rea. In 
his first-rate book World Without Design,2 rea argues that naturalism is not 
a philosophical thesis that is true or false but a research program that is 
used in trying to revise our beliefs toward truth. After summarizing rea’s 
description of naturalism in the next section, I will argue in Section II that 
a good case can be made that naturalism, contrary to what rea says, is 
naturally best understood as a philosophical thesis. In Section III, I ex-
amine two considerations that might be raised in answer to my position 
that naturalism is a philosophical thesis. I conclude with one final point 
in Section IV.
I
According to rea, a research program is a set of methodological disposi-
tions, where methodological dispositions are “dispositions to trust at least 
some of our cognitive faculties as sources of evidence and to take certain 
kinds of experiences and arguments to be evidence.”3 rea says that for 
most people most of the time methodological dispositions are most likely 
acquired without any reflection and even unconsciously. For example, 
“We tend automatically to trust our senses, our reasoning abilities, and 
our memories. The fact that mathematical and logical propositions seem 
1Barry Stroud, “The Charm of Naturalism,” in Naturalism in Question, ed. mario de Caro 
and David macarthur (Cambridge, mA: Harvard university Press, 2004), p. 22.
2michael C. rea, World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2002).
3Ibid., p. 2.
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obviously to be true we readily and unreflectively take as strong and suf-
ficient evidence in their favor.”4
An important characteristic of research programs is that they “cannot 
be adopted on the basis of evidence . . . [because] evidence can only be 
recognized as such from within a research program.”5 If one rejects one re-
search program in favor of another, the rejection is a choice made on prag-
matic grounds. A chosen research program is one whose consequences are 
most attractive or whose selection most irritates one’s enemies.6 Because 
there is no non-pragmatic neutral basis on which to judge the rational-
ity of a choice to reject one research program for another, there is no ba-
sis for claiming that naturalism is the research program for which non- 
naturalists should rationally choose to exchange their non-naturalism. 
Similarly, opponents of naturalism can provide no non-question-begging 
grounds to persuade naturalists to choose to reject their naturalism for 
non-naturalism. At best, the non-naturalist can bring forth pragmatic con-
siderations for such a rejection.
What, then, are the methodological dispositions of the naturalist? Ac-
cording to rea, they are those that inform the methods of science, and 
“naturalism is a research program which treats the methods of science 
and those methods alone as basic sources of evidence.”7 In support of his 
claim, rea presents an informative summary of the pillars of the natu-
ralist tradition that includes the likes of John Dewey and Willard van 
Orman Quine.8 Beyond the support for his understanding of naturalism 
that is provided by this historical survey, rea’s main reason for maintain-
ing that naturalism is a research program and not a philosophical thesis 
is that to hold that it is the latter would open it to the objection that it is 
a self-defeating position. An illustration of what rea has in mind here is 
most helpful.
Consider the suggestion that naturalism is the philosophical thesis that 
there are no supernatural entities.9 rea maintains that the thesis is unin-
formative because naturalists disagree about what it is for something to be 
supernatural as opposed to natural. Definition by example is not helpful 
because if one maintains that god, angels, ghosts, and immaterial souls 
are supernatural, then it is unclear what these entities have in common 
that makes them supernatural.
even if it were the case, however, that a plausible account of what 
qualifies these entities as supernatural could be provided, Rea believes 
that no version of naturalism can include such a supplementary account. 
This is the case because naturalism regards the natural sciences and their 
4Ibid.
5Ibid., p. 6.
6Ibid., pp. 6–7.
7Ibid., p. 67.
8Ibid., pp. 32–48.
9Ibid., p. 54.
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methods alone as the basic sources of evidence. Naturalism, therefore, de-
mands that we follow science wherever it leads and this implies that “nat-
uralism, whatever it is, must be compatible with anything science might 
tell us about nature or supernature. Thus, no version of naturalism can in-
clude any substantive thesis about the nature of nature or supernature,”10 
because were it to do so it would run the risk of imploding. After all, rea-
sons rea, if naturalism must be compatible with anything science might 
tell us about nature or supernature, then the methods of science might one 
day lead us to the conclusion that the best explanation of a phenomenon is 
the existence and activity of a supernatural entity. But if naturalism is the 
philosophical thesis that there are no supernatural entities, then natural-
ism will have defeated itself.
After examining other proposals for taking naturalism as a philosophical 
thesis and explaining how each faces the problem of being self-defeating, 
rea concludes that naturalism must be understood not as a philosophi-
cal thesis but as a research program. Any attempt “to convert naturalism 
into a substantive philosophical thesis arises out of nonnaturalistic ways 
of thinking.”11
II
rea’s argument is both engaging and important. Is it, however, correct? 
I have my doubts, and they include but go beyond the fact, which rea 
recognizes, that so many naturalists themselves regard naturalism as a 
philosophical thesis. Of such naturalists rea says that they “have unwit-
tingly mischaracterized it.”12 But have they? To see if they have, it is help-
ful to ask the following question: What are the methods of science that 
rea claims are the basic sources of evidence in the naturalist research pro-
gram? Quite interestingly, rea answers that,
Notoriously, it is hard to say exactly what methods are supposed to count 
as the methods of science. But I think we will do well enough . . . if we say 
that the methods of science are, at the present time anyway, those methods 
(including canons of good argument, criteria for theory choice, and so on) 
regularly employed and respected in contemporary biology, chemistry, and 
physics departments. reliance on memory and testimony is included in the 
methods of science, as well as reliance on judgments about apparent mathe-
matical, logical, and conceptual truths. . . . Presumably there are constraints: 
not just any method could count as scientific. But I see no reason to take a 
position on what those constraints are.13
In short, when we ask what are the methods of science that are the 
heart and soul of the naturalist research program, rea directs us to the dis-
ciplines of contemporary biology, chemistry, and physics, and adds that 
10Ibid., p. 55. The emphasis is rea’s.
11Ibid., p. 73.
12Ibid., p. 54.
13Ibid., p. 67. The emphases are rea’s.
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there presumably are some constraints on the methods employed therein. 
“Not just any method could count as scientific.”14
Can an example of the constraints that rea has in mind be provided? 
I believe that one can and will turn to some of rea’s own comments for 
guidance. In his overview of the pillars of naturalism, rea states that 
“there are reasons for seeing Aristotle as an opponent of naturalism. Af-
ter all, the modern scientific method was developed partly in contrast 
with Aristotelian science; and his essentialism and teleology have been 
favorite targets of criticism among the scientifically minded ever since 
the seventeenth century.”15 Later, rea adds that the naturalist Auguste 
Comte, who had a methodological vision of a unified empirical method 
for every area of human inquiry, “reject[ed] the quest for . . . teleology in 
nature.”16 In light of these comments by rea, I believe we can come up 
with a condition that ensures that a method of inquiry is not scientific. 
To explain the content of this condition, it is important to note the fact 
that explanations of some of our own physical bodily movements (e.g., 
my typing this paper) typically make reference to mental causes such as 
intentions and choices whose explanations are teleological in nature and 
grounded in mental events/states such as our beliefs and desires. In light 
of this fact, let us say that a sufficient condition of a method being non-
scientific in nature is that it countenance explanations of physical events 
that make reference to what is mental in nature, whether purposes or 
causes. If a method that does this is non-scientific in nature, then a nec-
essary condition of a method being scientific is that it not countenance 
explanations of physical events that make reference to either mental pur-
poses or causes. This conception of a scientific method is hardly robust 
in any positive sense. Indeed, it is essentially a via negativa. Because it 
is a negative way, however, it provides a constraint that in rea’s words 
ensures that “not just any method could count as scientific.”17 moreover, 
this negative way is embraced by biology, chemistry, and physics, which 
are rea’s examples of disciplines whose methods are paradigmatically 
scientific. For present purposes, then, inclusion of this via negativa condi-
tion helps constitute an adequate conception of methods that count as 
scientific in nature.
What, now, about naturalism as a philosophical thesis? Do we have an 
adequate understanding of it? According to rea, if naturalism is a philo-
sophical thesis, then
[t]here must be some reason why the relevant [different versions of natural-
ism] are rightly identified as versions of naturalism rather than as disparate 
[philosophical] theses that bear no substantive relation to one another. . . . 
[I]t seems that naturalism ought to be characterized as whatever it is that 
14Ibid., p. 67.
15Ibid., p. 26. The emphasis is rea’s.
16Ibid., p. 30.
17Ibid., p. 67.
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the different ‘versions’ have in common. As it is, however, we are often left 
largely in the dark as to what the connection between the various putative 
versions of naturalism is supposed to be.18
Contrary to what rea claims, I believe that we are not left largely in the 
dark about the essence of naturalism, when naturalism is understood as 
a philosophical thesis. The light that we have about this issue is provided 
by three naturalists who regard naturalism as a philosophical thesis. First, 
consider the following thoughts that David Papineau provides about this 
issue. According to Papineau, naturalism is a commitment to the com-
pleteness of physics, where physics is complete in the sense that a purely 
physical specification of the world, plus physical laws, will always suffice 
to explain what happens. Papineau is aware that the concepts of physics 
change over time. What categories, therefore, will qualify as “physical” 
in the final or ultimate physics? Papineau claims that we cannot answer 
this question with any certitude. At best, we can pursue a via negativa and 
specify one category that will not qualify for inclusion, namely, the cat-
egory of the psychological attitudes such as beliefs, desires, and choices 
that represent things being a certain way:
When I say that a complete physics excludes psychology, and that psycho-
logical antecedents are therefore never needed to explain physical effects, 
the emphasis is on ‘needed.’ I am quite happy to allow that psychological 
categories can be used to explain physical effects, as when I tell you that my 
arm rose because I wanted to lift it. my claim is only that in all such cases an 
alternative specification of a sufficient antecedent, which does not mention 
psychological categories, will also be available.19
And again,
If you want to use the [argument that all physical effects are fully caused by 
purely physical prior histories], it isn’t crucial that you know exactly what 
a complete physics would include. much more important is to know what 
it won’t.
Suppose, to illustrate the point, that we have a well-defined notion of the 
mental realm, identified via some distinctive way of picking out properties 
as mental. (Thus we might identify this realm as involving intentionality, 
say, or intelligence, or indeed as involving consciousness—the precise char-
acterization won’t matter for the point I am about to make.) Then one way of 
understanding ‘physical’ would simply be as ‘non-mentally identifiable’—
that is, as standing for properties which can be identified independently of 
this specifically mental conceptual apparatus. And then, provided we can 
be confident that the ‘physical’ in this sense is complete—that is, that every 
non-mentally identifiable effect is fully determined by non-mentally identifi-
able antecedents—then we can conclude that that all mental states must be 
18Ibid., p. 53.
19David Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 31, n26. The em-
phasis is Papineau’s.
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identical with (or realized by) something non-mentally identifiable (other-
wise mental states couldn’t have non-mentally identifiable effects).20
Second, David Armstrong advocates naturalism as a philosophical the-
sis by proposing that ideal physics has an ultimately privileged explana-
tory role. According to Armstrong, naturalism is “the doctrine that reality 
consists of nothing but a single all-embracing spatio-temporal system.”21 
Armstrong points out that contemporary materialism is a form of natural-
ism and maintains that the single, all-embracing temporal system contains 
nothing but the entities recognized by the most mature physics. Irreduc-
ible mental explanation (explanation that involves ineliminable reference 
to mental causes or purposes) has no place in this (or any other) spa-
tiotemporal system as an ultimate or basic explanatory principle. Thus, 
Armstrong says that “if the principles involved [in analyzing the single, 
all-embracing spatiotemporal system that is reality] were completely dif-
ferent from the current principles of physics, in particular if they involved 
appeal to mental entities, such as purposes, we might then count the anal-
ysis as a falsification of naturalism.”22
Third, Andrew melnyk makes it clear that naturalists in general (and he 
in particular) deny the reality of both irreducible mental events and fun-
damental (irreducible) teleological explanations.23 As a participant in an 
online debate with Charles Taliaferro and me in which we claim that lib-
ertarian free choices are irreducible mental events that have fundamental 
teleological explanations, melnyk denies that conscious occurrences are 
irreducible mental events and states that “[n]aturalism claims that noth-
ing has a fundamental purposeful explanation. . . . Naturalism says that 
whenever an occurrence has a purposeful explanation, it has that explana-
tion in virtue of certain nonpurposeful (e.g., merely causal) facts.”24
If we follow the lead of Papineau, Armstrong, and melnyk, we arrive 
at the following position: naturalism is the philosophical thesis that the 
fundamental, ultimate, or final explanatory story about the nature and 
course of events in the physical world will exclude any mention of what is 
mental in nature. This understanding of naturalism does two things. First, 
it implies that the ultimate explanatory story about the physical world 
and all events in it will exclude both any causal chain of events whose first 
member is irreducibly mental in nature and any teleological explanations 
of physical events.25 Second, it comports well with the understanding of 
20David Papineau, Thinking about Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2002), 
p. 41. The emphasis is Papineau’s.
21David Armstrong, “Naturalism, materialism, and First Philosophy,” Philosophia 8 (1978), 
p. 261.
22Ibid., p. 262.
23Andrew melnyk, “Naturalism, Free Choices, and Conscious experiences,” 2007, http://
www.infidels.org/library/modern/andrew_melnyk/against-dualism.html.
24Ibid., p. 1.
25Paul Draper has suggested that I weaken my definition of ‘naturalism’ a bit so that it 
allows for irreducible mental causation of some events, as long as any chain of mental cau-
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the scientific method that was set forth earlier in this section, which is that 
a necessary condition of a method being scientific is that it not counte-
nance explanations of physical events that make reference to mental pur-
poses and causes. This second point is important in light of rea’s assertion 
(which I have already quoted) that “it is hard to say what methods are 
supposed to count as the methods of science. . . . Presumably there are con-
straints: not just any method could count as scientific. But I see no reason 
to take a position on what those constraints are.”26 my claim is that there 
is a known constraint: the explanatory space of the methods of science 
excludes mental explanations.
If we assume that naturalism is the philosophical thesis that the ul-
timate or final explanatory story about the nature and course of events 
in the physical world will exclude any mention of what is mental in na-
ture, then how will this bear upon the claim mentioned in Section I that 
naturalism implies that there are no supernatural entities? rea claims that 
taking naturalism to imply this is uninformative because, for example, it 
is not clear what entities like god, angels, ghosts, and immaterial souls 
have in common that would warrant their classification and exclusion as 
supernatural entities. But surely one thing that god, angels, and imma-
terial souls have in common (I’m not sure about ghosts) is that they are 
subjects of mental attitudes (e.g., beliefs, desires, choices, intentions) that 
are causally and teleologically involved in explaining the occurrences of 
at least some events in the physical world. Thus, naturalism entails at least 
that there are no explanatorily relevant supernatural entities because in 
sation does not begin with irreducible mental causation. In other words, any first mental 
event that is an irreducible cause must itself have a physical cause. According to Draper, this 
understanding of naturalism is compatible with two essential naturalist claims. First, the 
mental (if it exists) emerged from the physical rather than vice versa. Second, all teleological 
explanations can be reduced to scientific explanations.
In my estimation, this is not a substantive, but a cosmetic, weakening of my definition 
of ‘naturalism.’ Consider mental causation. While Draper’s proposal allows for irreducible 
mental causes, it will not allow those causes to occupy an ultimate status as heads of explan-
atory chains in the final explanatory story. Then, there is teleological explanation. Draper 
claims that it is essential to naturalism that all teleological explanations be reducible to scien-
tific explanations. This comports perfectly with my proposed understanding of naturalism, 
which holds that the ultimate explanatory story will not include teleological explanations of 
physical events.
Thomas Flint has pointed out to me that strictly speaking naturalism, understood as the 
philosophical thesis that the final explanatory story about the nature and course of events in 
the physical world will exclude any mention of what is mental in nature, does not imply that 
ultimately there will be no teleological explanations of physical events. After all, says Flint, 
one might be a weird Aristotelian naturalist who denies that we need to appeal to the mental 
to explain anything but thinks that lots of explanations are teleological in nature (e.g., acorns 
act as they do because their telos/end is to become oaks).
I agree that there is logical space for such a weird Aristotelian position but believe that 
the position is completely unmotivated. Our best, if not only, route into understanding the 
concept of teleological explanation is one that passes through our own minds and, therefore, 
any position (e.g., naturalism) that denies the irreducible reality of what is mental will have 
no reason to introduce the reality of non-mental teleological explanations. moreover, if natu-
ralism is anything, it is a position that seeks to rid the world of teleology. 
26rea, World Without Design, p. 67. The emphasis is rea’s.
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principle it will not allow what is mental in nature to enter into the ul-
timate explanatory story of the physical world. And because science (at 
least in the forms of biology, chemistry, and physics) is methodologically 
committed to accepting only non-mental explanations of physical events, 
it will never arrive at a position where it must postulate the existence of 
a supernatural entity to account adequately for some physical feature of 
or event in the physical world. Should science come across some physical 
feature or event for which it cannot presently provide an adequate physi-
cal/non-mental explanation, it will simply insist that it has failed to find a 
plausible physical explanation for that physical feature or event and will 
go on trying to find this kind of explanation.
What, now, about rea’s main concern with understanding naturalism 
as a philosophical thesis? Does understanding naturalism in the way I 
have suggested leave open the possibility that naturalism might self-de-
struct? It is possible to envision a defense put forth by a naturalist in or-
der to avoid an implosion of his view. Consider the issue of teleological 
explanation. A naturalist might worry that naturalism would self-destruct 
because the methods of science are themselves employed for the funda-
mental purpose of revising our beliefs by discarding old ones and acquir-
ing new ones. given what Papineau, Armstrong, and melnyk have told 
us, however, naturalism cannot implode in this way. recall what Papineau 
tells us: while he is quite happy to grant that psychological categories can 
be used to explain physical effects in a case where he tells us that his arm 
rose because he wanted to lift it, he insists in this case (and all others like 
it) that an alternative description will be available in the complete scien-
tific story that does not make use of psychological (teleological) catego-
ries.27 If this is true for the rising of his arm, then it is surely true for the 
pursuit of science. While it is true that we now employ mental (teleologi-
cal) categories to explain what science is about, the naturalist will insist 
that an alternative description will be available in the complete scientific 
explanation of the practice of science, where that scientific explanation 
will not make mention of any fundamental teleological explanation. The 
correct story will be thoroughly non-teleological in nature and, therefore, 
naturalism will not defeat itself.
Is there any other way in which naturalism might self-destruct, when 
understood as the philosophical thesis that the ultimate explanatory story 
about the physical world will exclude any mention of what is mental in 
nature? I can think of two other possibilities.
First, one might wonder about how the belief in naturalism, which 
seems to be an irreducibly mental event in virtue of its contents, fits into 
the overall naturalist story. Presumably the naturalist will insist that the 
belief in naturalism is or is realized in a physical event or state, and like 
any other physical event or state will ultimately be explicable in thorough-
ly non-mental terms.
27Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, p. 31, n26.
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The matter of the explicability of the belief in naturalism raises the pos-
sibility of a second way in which one might argue that naturalism self- 
destructs. C. S. Lewis is well known for, among other things, having ar-
gued that naturalism is self-defeating.28 He believed that it is self-defeating 
because the belief that naturalism is true, if justified, must ultimately be 
caused by other beliefs in virtue of their contents. If Lewis was right about 
this, then naturalism must recognize the reality of irreducible mental cau-
sation and, therefore, the claim that the ultimate explanatory story about 
the physical world can be told in exclusively non-mental terms is false.
This is not the place to set forth Lewis’ argument,29 but it seems to me 
that the naturalist could respond to it by claiming that the belief in natural-
ism is basic or foundational in nature, and contrary to what Lewis assumed, 
not in need of justification in terms of other beliefs. If this response seems 
implausible, a naturalist might claim that it is surely no more implausible 
than claiming that naturalism is a research program and not a philosophi-
cal thesis. After all, rea tells us that the methodological dispositions of re-
search programs are held or acquired without any reflection and even uncon-
sciously.30 If this is the case and the naturalist is fundamentally disposed to 
trust the empirical methods of science, then it is not much of a stretch to 
think that naturalism as a philosophical thesis occupies a basic position in 
the naturalist’s noetic structure. If it does, then this guarantees that natural-
ism is not and will not be self-defeating in the way that Lewis argued.
It is important to point out that to hold that the belief in naturalism is 
basic is not to hold that it is uncaused. Presumably it is caused. Its causes, 
however, will, given the truth of naturalism, ultimately be completely de-
scribable in non-mental categories that can be included in a larger explan-
atory story that is exclusively non-mental in nature.
III
In this section, I set forth and respond to two considerations that might be 
raised in answer to my argument for the view that naturalism is a philo-
sophical thesis. The first consideration is one that Rea himself has brought 
up. In correspondence, he states that he does not see any deep justifica-
tion for my understanding of naturalism as a philosophical thesis. “True, 
you’ve found three people who endorse the thesis [as understood by you] 
and say things that suggest that this is what naturalism is. But why think 
they’re right?”
One of the reasons I believe these people are right has much to do with 
rea’s point that there is a close relationship between naturalism and science. 
The question is: What is the nature of that relationship? rea’s perspective 
28C. S. Lewis, miracles: a Preliminary study, rev. ed. (New York: macmillan, 1978).
29Charles Taliaferro and I state and give a defense of Lewis’s argument (the argument 
from reason) in Naturalism (grand rapids, mI: eerdmans, 2008). For another defense of Lew-
is’s argument, see Victor reppert, C. s. lewis’ Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the argument from 
reason (Downers grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003).
30rea, World Without Design, p. 2.
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is that naturalists are methodologists who regard the natural sciences and 
their methods alone as basic sources of evidence. As I see things, a funda-
mental weakness in rea’s argument for understanding naturalism in the 
way that he does is his failure to clarify adequately what are the meth-
ods of science that supposedly inspire and guide naturalists. Once it is 
made clear that the scientific method as such excludes explanations that 
make reference to mental causes and purposes, there is a perfectly natural 
explanation for why naturalists are keenly interested in the natural sci-
ences. This explanation is that naturalists are individuals who espouse a 
philosophical thesis that takes the natural sciences’ methodological com-
mitment to excluding mental explanations of physical events and converts 
it into a metaphysical axiom. given that naturalists begin with a commit-
ment to a philosophical thesis that requires ultimately explaining every-
thing that occurs in the physical world in terms of physical/non-mental 
terms, they naturally look favorably upon the natural sciences because 
those disciplines are methodologically committed to finding non-mental 
explanations of physical events.
Are there naturalists who characterize naturalism as something other 
than a philosophical thesis? most certainly there are. But in the spirit of 
a good tu quoque response to rea, why think they’re right? After all, it is 
hard not to be skeptical when these naturalists (e.g., Quine) claim that 
they would acknowledge the reality of souls, god, etc., if science found 
a place for them.31 One cannot help but be skeptical here because these 
naturalists prefer the methods of science above all others,32 methods that 
deny any explanatory space to what is mental. One finds it very difficult 
to avoid concluding that these naturalists, if they were consistent, would 
refuse to acknowledge a place for souls and god in the explanatory story 
of events in the physical world. How could they do anything else, given 
the methodological commitment that denies any explanatory space for 
what is mental?
The second consideration that might be raised in answer to my argu-
ment for the view that naturalism is a philosophical thesis is that the posi-
tion I have defended is one that rea has already addressed and refuted.33 
For example, in his survey of versions of metaphysical naturalism rea 
characterizes the following “quasi-ontological” formulation of naturalism 
by Philip Pettit:
Naturalism imposes a constraint on what there can be, stipulating that there 
are no nonnatural or unnatural, praeternatural or supernatural entities. . . . 
Nature comprises those entities and constructs made of those entities that 
the ideal physics, realistically interpreted, posits.34
31Ibid., p. 42.
32Ibid., p. 43.
33An anonymous referee raised this objection.
34rea, World Without Design, p. 57. Pettit’s work is entitled “The Nature of Naturalism,” 
Proceedings of the aristotelian society, suppl. vol. 66 (1992), pp. 245–266.
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rea believes that this characterization of naturalism fails because it
is either an obviously false metaphysical thesis or else a disguised episte-
mological thesis. As we all know, there is in fact no such thing as the ideal 
physics or the best physics. The physics we now have is not the best (oth-
erwise there would be no reason to continue trying to improve it) and it is 
less than ideal. But if there is no ideal physics, then there is no ontology of the 
ideal physics. Thus, taken at face value [this quasi-ontological thesis] implies 
that no ontology is correct. But that is obviously false. Of course, the idea 
probably is that the correct ontology is whatever ontology would be (or, more 
optimistically, will be) implied by an ideal physical theory if (or when) such 
a one were to exist. But if that is right, then [this quasi-ontological thesis] is 
not so much a metaphysical thesis as an affirmation of the ability of physics 
to tell us the whole truth about the world. In other words, it is a disguised 
epistemological thesis. It does not tell us what, specifically, exists. Rather, it 
just expresses the conviction that, whatever exists, an ideal physics will be 
able to detect it.35
Does my position that naturalism is a philosophical thesis escape 
through the horns of the dilemma presented by rea? I believe that it does. 
In explaining how it does, it is relevant to note that my formulation of 
naturalism makes no mention of any physics, ideal or otherwise. Instead, 
it is stated in terms of an ultimate explanatory story about the nature and 
course of events in the physical world. In so far as this explanatory story 
is ultimate or final in nature, it is the ideal explanatory story. If we adapt 
rea’s criticism to my conception of naturalism, we end up with something 
like the following: “my characterization of naturalism fails because there 
is at present no such thing as the ideal explanatory story. But if there is no 
ideal explanatory story, then there is no ontology of that ideal explanatory 
story. This implies that no ontology is correct, which is obviously false. 
The idea, then, must be that the correct ontology is that which would be 
implied by the ideal explanatory story, were it to exist. In that case, how-
ever, naturalism as I understand it is no more than an affirmation of an 
ability of that explanatory story to tell us the whole truth about the world. 
It is a disguised epistemological thesis that does not tell us what, specifi-
cally, exists. It just expresses the conviction that, whatever exists, the ideal 
explanatory story will include it.”
What is important to note when considering my formulation of natu-
ralism in light of rea’s dilemma is that the ideal explanatory story does tell 
us, specifically, what exists. What it tells us is that what exists includes that 
which is physical in nature and that the ultimate explanation of anything 
and everything that happens to what is physical in nature does not include 
any reference to what is mental in nature. While the exclusion of ultimate 
mental explanations is negative in character, it is both extremely deep and 
broad in scope and, what is particularly relevant to rea’s dilemma, onto-
logical in nature (it tells us, specifically, what does not exist). Because we 
know what we do about the ontology of the ideal explanatory story, my 
35Ibid., pp. 57–58. The emphases are rea’s.
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view that naturalism is a philosophical thesis is one that has not already 
been addressed and refuted by rea.
IV
There is, then, a plausible understanding of naturalism that renders rea’s 
claim that it is a research program and not a philosophical thesis implau-
sible. In closing, I raise one final issue. It concerns Rea’s main reason for 
maintaining that naturalism is a research program. He states that if natu-
ralism were a philosophical thesis, then it would be exposed to the cri-
tique that it is self-defeating. Perhaps out of the principle of charity, rea 
is inclined to assume that no philosopher (at least, no naturalist) would 
advocate a position that is self-defeating. While it is hard to disagree with 
being charitable, it is equally hard to deny that philosophers sometimes 
defend positions that are self-defeating. Here, the logical positivists come 
to mind. They were ardent proponents of the verification principle, which 
was roughly the thesis that no statement is meaningful unless it is either a 
tautology or empirically verifiable. When it finally dawned on someone to 
ask whether the verification principle itself was either a tautology or em-
pirically verifiable, the fate of logical positivism was pretty much sealed. 
given that naturalism can plausibly be viewed as the principal heir of 
logical positivism, one should not be too quick to dismiss the possibility 
that it too is self-defeating. I for one do not find it the least implausible to 
think that a philosophical thesis, and naturalism in particular, might be 
self-defeating. Thus, while I tried in the previous section to explain how 
a naturalist might argue that naturalism, when taken as a philosophical 
thesis, is not self-defeating, I am not convinced that this argument is suc-
cessful.36 even if it is not, why should that lead us to conclude that natural-
ism is only a research program? Perhaps there are some naturalists who 
regard it as such, but there seem to be just as many, if not more, who take it 
as a philosophical thesis. Not only should we take them at their word, but 
also we should take seriously the possibility that they might very well be 
correct in viewing naturalism as a philosophical thesis. What I have tried 
to do in this brief paper is explain why I believe they are correct.37
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36See Goetz and Taliaferro, Naturalism.
37I want to thank Paul Draper, Thomas Flint, J. P. moreland, michael rea, Charles Talia-
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